All right, welcome everybody.
We'll continue with Ruf, Seth and Data Security.
So I'll hand it over to our speakers.
Thank you.
Well, it's very nice to be at FOSDEM.
It's first for me.
I'm glad to have made it here.
We work for IBM, but as you can hear from my voice, I had a little bit of a tough time
traveling.
So instead of wearing my corporate circular 223.7 compliant blue shirt, you get my academic
look instead, which for those of you that are local gives you a great joke because it
took me as a Harvard graduate 10 minutes to find the stairs to this floor.
So anyway, jet lag.
Let's call it jet lag.
So my marketing manager taught me an important lesson years ago, which is it's my practice
not to introduce yourself.
So the short version is had the privilege of spending my entire career in open source
or nearly so.
I spent the last 10 years working on Seth.
Before that, I was the product person for Ubuntu Server.
And before that, I was the very much feared systems management at SUSE.
A bunch of other things that I worked on was the maintainer of man for about 10 years.
A picture there with the clouds is because they wrote a book on AWS, stuff like that.
I think that's enough for me.
Hi, everyone.
I'm Sage McTaggart and I use they them pronouns.
I'm also at IBM and working on cybersecurity.
I come from a decision to leave academia and work at Red Hat and then we move to IBM.
And in terms of that side of my background, I've done everything from theoretical computer
science, focusing on things like formal language theory, oblivious computation to just plain
storage system security.
I strongly support open source.
I love implementing the principles in my work.
And I am really excited to talk about sort of the work that we've been doing on a security
side within IBM because it's not all writing little toy languages for provable security.
It's solving practical problems.
So you'll hear a lot about that for me later.
So I think this being the SDS Dev Room, we're going to spare you the introduction to SAF
and the introduction to Rook.
But they're awesome.
Let's just sum it up as that.
So let's start with security.
So security practices are hard in a specific point of the infrastructure.
Cherry picking practices without a model of the threat in the attacker is not a viable
strategy.
The joke usually goes that to make a computer secure, you cover it in concrete, drop it
at the bottom of the ocean and all that.
But that's not a very useful computer.
If you want to protect from all possible threats, you get a machine that is not very helpful
in solving any of your problems.
So what you do is that you define security in the context of your application and your
users.
Who are your adversaries?
Who is most likely to attack you and you prioritize that?
Yes, there are some theories of security that say patch everything, protect from everything.
But the reality is if you don't pick your priorities, then you have no priorities.
If you are trying to do everything, you're doing nothing.
So some of these actors want to cryptologue you and hold you for ransom.
Others are just happy to delete your data and cause a disruption.
These are very different threats.
Script kiddies, who knows what they're up to?
Just some excitement.
Organized crime wants money back.
So you profile your adversary and you define what your threat model looks like and then
you start hardening for that threat model.
So let's dive right in.
The public security zone, let's start from the network.
The public security zone in SF network is an entirely untrusted area of the cloud.
It could be the internet as a whole or just networks external to your cluster.
You have no authority over.
Data transmissions crossing this zone should make use of encryption.
Note that the public zone, as I just defined it, does not include the storage cluster front
end, the SF public underscore network, which defines the storage front end and properly
belongs in the storage access zone.
So don't confuse the two.
The SF client zone refers to networks accessing SF clients like the object gateway, the SF
file system, or block storage.
SF clients are not always excluded from the public security zone.
For instance, it is possible to expose the object gateways as three-year swift interfaces
in the public security zone.
Next, the storage access zone is instead an internal network providing SF clients with
access to the storage network itself.
Finally, the cluster zone refers to the most internal network providing storage nodes with
connectivity for application, hard beat, backfill, recovery, and all that.
This zone includes the SF clusters backend network called the clustered network in SF.
Operators often run clear text traffic in the cluster zone relying on the physical separation
or VLAN segregation of the network from other traffic.
This would not be a valid choice going back to the previous point if your threat model
includes privileged adversarial insiders.
But it's perfectly fine if you're dealing with script kiddies.
So again, threat profile.
These four zones are separately mapped and combined depending on the use case and threat
model on your actual physical and VLAN network.
Components spanning the boundary of two security zones with different trust or authentication
requirements must be carefully configured.
These are natural weak points.
Maybe they're not natural weak points, but they are natural targets in network architecture
and should be always configured to meet the requirements of the highest trust level of
the two zones or the two or three zones.
Connected.
In many cases, the security controls should be a primary concern due to the likelihood
of probing for misconfiguration.
Operators should consider exceeding zone requirements at integration points, which for a storage
product is usually easier to accomplish than it would be for something more generic like
an operating system.
For example, the cluster security zone can be isolated from other zones easily because
there is no reason for it to connect to other zones.
Conversely, an object gateway in the client security zone will need access to the cluster
security zones monitors 6789 OSDs on 6800 all the way to however many OSDs you have
and will likely expose its S3 API to the public security zone ports 80 and 443.
I think that's right.
There we go.
Thank you.
Hi, everybody.
So many people might be curious.
We moved to IBM about a year ago.
What's it like to move companies as an open source product?
And the security of a product, we worry a lot about that.
We're going to discuss that, of course.
But how do we support it in a realistic way within industry?
We can obviously find, we can make a fork of an open source product that's no longer
supported, but do you really want to be in charge of maintaining that, updating all of
its dependencies?
Not necessarily.
So I'll be discussing some aspects of IBM product security, how that's been going in
practice and in theory, and I'll discuss some of our accomplishments and what we're
planning going forward.
So in terms of product security, we follow a secure development life cycle with the goal
of reducing risk and improving security for Seth and Rook.
We suggest improvements.
We pen test.
We manifest all of our dependencies.
We review vulnerabilities.
We track weaknesses.
We review them at any exploits.
We're approving all of our Arata releases, making sure all the details are correct so
that anybody, customer or not, can look and say, okay, what does this release fix?
And as a result, we've been trying to modify this to work within a different model from
Red Hat to IBM.
And one thing that we've done is we've manifested and documented all of our dependencies.
That's a challenge.
I'm not sure if I can officially call it an S-bomb.
That would be a legal question.
But getting there was a challenge.
There are thousands and thousands of dependencies of dependencies, things like that.
We've also automated things like security scanning.
Customers want clean scans, and this is true also in open source.
We get emails on the security list saying, hey, MEND found 200 vulnerabilities, 80% of
them are false positives, half those CVEs have been rejected, but what are you going
to do to fix it?
So we're working to reduce even our lowest risk vulnerabilities as long as it's actually
a vulnerability.
We're onboarded fully with IBM P-Cert, and we're fixing all of our prior vulnerabilities
no matter how low risk.
That might seem silly, but it's a common compliance request.
And in theory, somebody could find an exploit for even a very low CVE, and then it suddenly
is no longer such a low risk CVE.
Suddenly it's actually an implemented one.
And we're also trying to make our lives easier for the programming team and my work easier
as well by automating all most of our dependencies.
We'll see how realistic it is to do all, but most is definitely true.
This can oftentimes break builds though, because sometimes the code might have been refactored,
details might change.
It's not just as simple as update this number.
So we're building that into our release cycle, and we're starting by prioritizing libraries
and dependencies with many CVEs per release, which thankfully they're finding the CVEs,
but we want to start with the known ones first.
So we'll be doing that.
We're continuing to do our work of reviewing existing vulnerabilities, regular security
updates, and just improving our code security preemptively.
We've gotten a lot of upstream engagement since moving to IBM, people emailing the
stuff security list, multiple people with hundreds of vulnerabilities, lots of individual
people emailing it with one or two that we investigate and we're signing CVEs.
We're doing just a lot more there, and we've been implementing more changes based on customer
and upstream requests, such as an update to the OS that the containers are running on.
So we're eventually, in addition to all this, going to be following IBM standards to fix
our vulnerabilities and ensure compliance.
Currently we're fixing all of the backlog of very low risk bugs and vulnerabilities
that we had, and we aim to be fully within IBM SLA and requirements by end of 2024.
That should just give you an idea of how secure upstream stuff is going to be, because again,
these are getting ported between Red Hat, upstream, and IBM.
So how are we going to do this, given that we have a very small security team and a slightly
larger but still very small build team?
The answer is automation.
A lot of this work has historically been very manual, very in-depth, and that's just not
realistic when we're talking about the number of vulnerabilities, the number of people involved,
and the product.
By tracking dependencies, we're finding hundreds of things that we might not have even known
about a while though, because we're like, oh, well, it doesn't really matter.
It's just used in the build process.
Actually it does matter.
So we're trying to write our own internal software for a lot of this work.
We're trying to figure out how to open source it so you aren't just like, hmm, this is some
random IBM specific website that you have to log on to their VPN to get our container,
and this code makes no sense.
No, we want it to actually be available, and that's a challenge, but it's one that we are
investigating, and our commitment remains open source.
So where we're able to open source any of this internal software, it will be open sourced.
If it is incredibly specific, it may not be very useful if it's public, but anything
useful we want to share with industry.
And we're also sharing that within IBM.
For example, one software that we wrote is to find all of our dependencies for our licensing
needs.
So it's about sharing this ethos of open source within our company of, hey, take the software,
you might licensing team, you're spending days filling out spreadsheets.
This is something that by sharing and improving on, your work is easier.
So we're sharing this open source ethos there.
We've also, in terms of automation, we've automated most of our compliance scans via
Jenkins and our build pipeline, reducing the work of incident response from a multi-person
team to something that can be done by one person as part of their job.
And we're documenting all the core parts of the role, trying to define it, and trying
to define what a security process looks like.
Similar to how we did a secure software lifecycle at Red Hat, we're trying to define now, what
does this job look like, what does the documentation look like?
And again, if anything is able to be open sourced or is of use to industry, we definitely
want to share it.
In terms of other new work, again, fixing all CVE fixes, they'll be ported.
New collaboration produces many new challenges.
But it's overall going really well.
Some things that we've done, we've worked to improve the call home functionality and
security for IBM support by applying open source principles.
If a vulnerability is there, customer smells it, people will see it.
Visible bugs are good.
When we know a bug, we can fix it.
So we're working on using stuff also as a back end for AI.
We're happy to talk more, reach out to us, collaborate with us.
What do you want to see with our collaboration with IBM?
Feel free to discuss with us.
I also want to briefly discuss some of our new cryptography work.
So we've been working with IBM research here a bit.
We've been talking with them about confidential and quantum computing.
Now, those are two separate things.
In terms of confidential computing, many of you may be aware of what that is.
It uses a trusted computing module, so you don't necessarily have to trust the server
that CEP is running on.
You just have to trust the TCM within it.
We're talking with IBM research about how would this best fit in with SAP?
If it's viable, we'll be implementing it.
With quantum computing, this is a priority for IBM, and they want to make a lot more
software quantum safe, for example.
So one thing that we're doing there is we're documenting all places where we use cryptography,
determining if it's quantum safer because who the quantum safe requirements are coming
out this year as are the libraries.
We're seeing, are we using public key encryption?
Are we using symmetric encryption, asymmetric encryption?
Where exactly are we using it?
And where can we plug and play in these open source quantum safe cryptography libraries
as they become available?
So those are some of our goals and things that we're working on collaborating with them with.
These are not yet in CEP releases, but this is sort of a road map to the future of
collaboration with IBM.
And moving on to talk a little bit more about how CEP currently does encryption and key management.
Currently, what we do is we encrypt our data at rest.
We have a choice, but most people choose to encrypt their data at rest using the Linux
unified key setup, aka Lux.
All the data, metadata of a CEP storage cluster can be secured using a variety of DM
encrypt configurations.
Almost all of our customers choose to do that.
We implement security best practices by locating our monitor, our Mons on a separate host from
the OSDs that ensures anti-affinity of the keys in the data that they encrypt.
This means that a driver host is physically separated from its decryption keys,
which increases security and is just generally a best practice.
Our object store gateway has some additional capabilities, including encryption at ingest
in time, the use of per user keys, key rotation using tools like Vault.
We support AWS, SS, E, KMS, and others.
We have department of defense ciphers certified under FIPS 140-2 as supplied by reline appropriate
versions.
And for encryption and transit, we have network communication that can be secured by turning
on the CEP protocol encryption and messenger version 2.1.
We do allow clear text as a backup, but it isn't our only option.
You can definitely certify your encryption and transit or use encryption and transit
as well.
And we also have the protocols where the CEP protocol is physically or logically isolated,
but if you again want more security, messenger version 2.
The back end protocols are not encrypted by default, but you absolutely can.
And it gives it just a teeny little bit of latency.
It doesn't really impact the performance that much, especially when CPU overhead is accounted
for.
Looking at more specific protocols for encryption and transit, S3 is usually secured between
the RGW and the S3 client with TLS, port 443.
You can also support plain HTTP on port 80, depending on the nature of your data.
And if you want it to be secured or not, we have a special case with our TLS termination
at HA proxy.
And the link between HA proxy and RGW is in clear text, so it has to be located within
the appropriate security zone.
But as we saw earlier, the security zones are a great feature of Saffron Rook.
So that makes it easier.
And of course, with your network, you want to follow your best practices such as firewalling
individual nodes.
You only want to expose a clear list of ports.
But assuming that you're doing that, that really covers a lot of our encryption and transit.
And let's talk a little bit now about Rook specific and not just Saff.
So Rook can use custom resource definitions to chain code many of these settings.
We can configure our trust certificates for our RGW SWEB server.
Rook supports at rest data encryption, as discussed earlier.
And again, we have in-flight Saff protocol encryption as of 1.9.
Kubernetes user permission system also applies to the persistent volumes here.
Permissions, quotas, all that comes from Kubernetes.
Nothing Rook needs to do here.
And Rook also supports a key management software in the CSI driver, allowing individual volumes
to be encrypted with their own key.
This really limits the scope per key.
Again, security best practices.
So we can follow those like key rotation, revocation, limiting scope from each key.
This really limits the scope of our unencrypted traffic, and it also limits the scope of each key.
And going on to the control plane, as popular as by Ansible, SSH is used by Seth Edmund,
Seth Ansible, and other deployment day one tools to provide a secure command line path
for installation and upgrade operations as part of post management.
We do this so that the dashboard is usually, unless you configure it specifically, is not
exposed to the world.
People can't even see our Grafana dashboard.
It's great.
And also, although we don't want our dashboard to be exposed to the world, it needs to be
reachable by the operator's workstation to be of use.
So that's our control plane here.
And we're doing that with SSH and how we install Saff by default.
The manager supports the whole infrastructure.
It needs to be reachable on the storage access zone.
So we use SSH for this.
And you can see some of our details, such as our port ranges and details like that.
Of course, the operator can modify this to have it suit your local threat model.
But by default, we just try to make it as secure by default so people don't have to
think too much about it.
And with identity and access, Seth's use of shared secret keys protects clusters from
man in the middle attacks by default.
A good practice here is to grant key ring read and write permissions only for the current
user and route.
Limit your client admin user to be restricted to route only.
You don't want all users to be root as per security best practices.
And similarly with RGW, we want to treat the administrator's key and secret with appropriate
respect.
Use your number of administrative users.
And to do so, we support AWS S3, the equivalent model for OpenStack, and the equivalent model
for OpenStack Swift.
Again, that helps your keys and secrets remain secure by using these external software for
your key management.
Your RGW user data is stored within Saff pools.
These are secured previously discussed with data at risk.
We also, in terms of keys, we can couple with OIDC providers such as Keycloak, and those
can be backed with your organization's identity provider for an even more granular role or
attribute access depending on the needs for your system and your threat model.
So for identity and access, we also support LDAP and Active Directory users.
We recommend secure LDAP and we support OpenStack Keystone to authenticate object gateway users
in OpenStack Clouds.
And for auditing, which is another important part of security, we of course support auditing.
Operator actions against a cluster are logged.
You need to periodically remove your logs and you can aggregate them to your log management
system where's appropriate.
Here's an example of what that might look like.
You can see where they're stored.
We can see this example here.
And you know, an action might start on one node, it might propagate to others, and we're
still logging everything.
So I'm going to turn it over to Federico for the end.
And here is data retention.
Thank you.
Yeah.
Alrighty.
Let's see if we can get it through to the end.
So, once they raise the lead, it generally cannot be recovered for practical use.
But like with everything, there are exceptions.
RBD is a new facility called the Trashbin that makes use of spare capacity to preserve
deleted images dynamically until the space is needed.
There are a certain number of days that's elapsed.
You can turn this on or off, but obviously this affects user data retention.
Similarly, in RGW, RGW is an implementation of the S3 protocol in most use cases.
S3 is versioned.
So your data is versioned there unless you configure pools to be not versioned.
So if you're storing user data in RGW, you need to watch that your configurations are,
that your pool configurations are versioned according to the data retention that you want for that data.
Otherwise, obviously the administrator can purge the versioning of RGW buckets, but that's one more thing that you have to account for to ensure compliance.
Then there is explicit secure deletion.
That's the other thing that we usually get asked about.
The data is still on the clusters on the disk.
And like in most storage systems, you cannot just go and say,
I'm trying to overwrite everything to sanitize that.
It won't even work on a standard SSD these days, at least not reliably, which is what you care about.
In the distributed network system, obviously it's not going to work.
So the solution there is doing the right thing from the beginning.
Implement at rest encryption.
When you want to sanitize your media, you forget the encryption key and you're done.
Very easy, very simple.
Also, this is other advantages.
You may want to sanitize your media typically because you have to return them under an RMA policy to have a warranty replacement.
If you try to replace a drive that's being shredded, shot with a shotgun,
or done all sort of untoward things to physically destroy it,
most likely your warranty provider will not send you a new drive for it.
So again, using encryption is the right strategy here.
Also, the majority of drives today does this on hardware for you, so you don't even need to manage.
Set up an encryption key and set up a process to wipe it when the time comes.
Then there is one more scenario, which is when you want to prevent sanitizing of data,
aka ransomware.
So the most interesting bit in CEPHER is that RGW is a second factor authentication thing,
and you can deploy this as a protection against ransomware attacks
so that you essentially ask for a second factor for actions that a ransomware attack would use to re-encrypt your data.
Hardening is relating to binaries.
Hardening options are highly vendor dependent.
These are Red Hat and IBM choices.
Other binaries from other vendors may be different.
Now, we ship with a Silinox on by default, and I don't think that surprises anybody,
given that it's our local religion at Red Hat, and we carried it over to IBM.
FIPS 140, two ciphers like Sage was saying earlier are supported out of REL,
so whenever REL is certified for FIPS 140 or two or now three with REL 9,
those versions can be used with stuff.
They're older versions of REL than the current ones.
There is lag, CISA needs to do the certification, but the option is there.
We're not going to go into these hardening options, but you should be aware that they exist,
and you should be knowing what your vendor uses.
And some bookmarks for you to close.
There are some interesting resources on Kubernetes from Acura Security,
and from a book from O'Reilly called Hacking Kubernetes.
It goes into very much into detail about storage in Chapter 6.
That's Michael Hausenblass' previous book.
The Data Security and Hardening Guide comes from our product,
and it's basically a written version of this talk,
so if you want more, that's where you find it.
Encrypted Secret Data at Rest is essentially another version
of what's in Rani's article.
And the last one is to decrypt those binary flags that I was describing one slide ago.
If you don't know what the GCC flags look like,
or what the kernel hardening options look like,
there is a link there with the linker flags for GCC.
There is also one, we ran out of space.
There is a convenient page on Ubuntu Server project team page
with all the kernel hardening options, so you can find what they are.
And then you look for your vendor, what the setting for that specific option is.
And that's it.